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ABSTRACT
Faced with the general period of political demobilisation since 2011, there is a
need to look beyond the manifest forms of political participation and to
better understand the dynamics of engagement among today’s Arab
Mediterranean youth. In this article, we inquire into the life experiences of
young people and, especially, explore the agentic dimensions of their
apparent disengagement. What societal processes shape their negative
attitudes toward engaging in public political life? What prospects are there for
further politicisation of youth in the post-2011 era? In order to address these
questions, we adopt a processual view of engagement, indicating that young
people’s agencies are geared towards the goals of livelihood, employment,
and attaining personal advancement and markers of social adulthood. These
in turn represent spheres of life that may aggregate instances of felt injustices
and thresholds of politicisation processes.
KEYWORDS Young people; political engagement; disengagement; demobilisation; Arab Mediterranean
countries
Introduction
In 2011, as soon as the popular uprisings erupted in Tunisia, Egypt and beyond,
the notion of youth gained much currency in the narratives of the so-called
Arab Spring. Young people in the region were often put forward as the main
agents of social and political change, and invested with high hopes as well
as concerns by decision-makers, policy analysts, and researchers alike. Some
would observe larger historical processes by which hitherto silenced and side-
lined youth would reclaim their due role in society, appearing now as citizens,
and notmere subjects as before, reclaiming their role in themaking of their col-
lective futures (Alexander 2011; Khalaf and Saad-Khalaf 2011). Others were less
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enthusiastic about the hype around ‘youth’, pointing to more long-term pro-
cesses of contentious politics (El-Mahdi 2011; Beinin 2012). In retrospect, the
early optimism of democratic transitions in the region was unfounded. Five
years on, Syria, Libya and Yemen have gone into downward spirals of violence,
and armed insurgences have challenged the realisation of democratic reforms
in Tunisia and Egypt. Young people face growing suppression of rights of
expression and assembly in the wake of an internally waged ‘war on terror’
against armed Islamist militants. Despite the revolutionary hopes and aspira-
tions, young people (some two-thirds of the population of ArabMediterranean
countries population are under 30 years of age) are generally excluded from a
fair share of the economic progress over recent decades, producing patterns of
rising inequality and marginalisation. In global terms, the share of young
people ‘not in education, employment or training’ (NEET) is nowhere higher
than in the Middle East and North Africa, a predicament that especially con-
cerns young women (OECD 2015, 10). High levels of youth unemployment
and economic hardships also imply more restricted access to housing and
delays in marriage, pushing scores of youth into, or a prolonged period of pre-
carious adolescence, whereby they face severe obstacles inmaking the necess-
ary transitions towards the roles and responsibilities commonly attached to
social adulthood (Honwana 2012). This trend, coupled with socioeconomic
pressures to earn a living and to establish a family, potentially marginalises
young men and women further, disenabling them from fully participating in
public life in the ways they feel they deserve (Assaad, Binzel, and Gadallah
2010; Herrera 2010).
Despite the peak of youth activism in the wake of 2011s popular uprisings,
it is evident that in the mid-2010s the large majority of young people do not
engage in public life through formal avenues of political participation such as
voting, political parties, or civil society organisations. The situation conspicu-
ously resembles that of the pre-2011 period (Herrera and Bayat 2010; Sika
2012). Moreover, as we shall discuss below, levels of trust in public political
life per se run low among them. The securitisation of public life, coupled
with the state discourses of providing stability and socioeconomic progress
at the expense of political rights and freedoms, represents today’s norm.
Although the post-2011 period witnessed the emergence of numerous
youth initiatives in the realms of politics, culture and social service delivery,
the preoccupations of today’s youth are more geared towards the goals of
livelihood, employment and personal advancement. Some put their daily
eﬀorts into studying, ﬁnding a job or building a career, others engage in
leisure and courtship, while others seek to migrate and ﬁnd better life
chances abroad (Salhi 2012). Some have been radicalised into armed Islamist
movements in their own countries or in the ranks of Islamic State in Syria and
Iraq, suggesting the emergence of regional interlinkages between youth radi-
calisation and marginalisation.
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Faced with the general period of political demobilisation since 2011, there
is a need to look beyond the manifest forms of political participation and to
better understand the contexts and modes of personal engagements
among the Arab Mediterranean youth today (Alhamad 2008; Lust-Okar and
Zerhouni 2008). In this article we inquire into the life experiences of young
people and, especially, explore the agentic dimensions of their apparent dis-
engagement. What societal processes shape their negative attitudes toward
participation in public political life? What prospects are there for the politici-
sation of youth in the post-2011 era? In order to address these questions, we
adopt a processual view of engagement among young people and thus do
not regard the dualisms of engagement/disengagement or politicisation/
depoliticisation as references to stable conditions but, rather, as interstitial
stages in their life courses. In this view, young people pass from engagement
to disengagement and from politicisation to depoliticisation – and vice versa –
both individually and collectively at diﬀerent times of their life trajectories.
Thus, in contrast to manifest forms of political participation – such as protest-
ing, voting and party politics – our special interest is to analyse the dynamics
of latent engagements and how these may trigger more protracted forms of
collective action among the young. Our intention is also to question the nor-
mative dualism of ‘passive’ and ‘active’ youth that often surfaces in public and
scholarly debates on youth political engagement.
In this vein, we ﬁrst explain the methodological underpinnings of this
article and then examine the agentive side of disengagement and discuss
the ways in which high-level political demands have given way to more
subtle, everyday concerns. We approach this through the notions of aspect
politics (Palonen 1988; Linjakumpu 2007) and active disengagement (Ekman
and Amnå 2012) showing that disengagement from political processes runs
in parallel with young people’s preoccupation with issues that are more
directly associated with their personal life trajectories. In the third part, we
discuss young people’s current concerns and the potential pathways
through which youth politicisation and political engagements may materia-
lise, taking our cue from the view that ‘avoiding politics’ (Eliasoph 1998)
does not necessarily mean renouncing the political. Before concluding
remarks, the fourth part reﬂects on young people’s livelihood considerations
in which the dynamics of engagement and politicisation unfold.
On methodological approaches
This paper draws on research material collected for a wider EU-funded
research consortium project entitled ‘SAHWA: Researching Arab Mediterra-
nean Youth – Towards a New Social Contract’ (www.sahwa.eu), which explores
the condition of young people in post-2011 Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt
and Lebanon. The SAHWA project adopted a mixed-methods approach,
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whereby qualitative and quantitative data were gathered on the ﬁeld by local
research teams and partner institutions in the ﬁve countries between March
2015 and January 2016. Within this framework, our task has been to focus
on the multiple dimensions and complexities of youth engagement in
these Arab Mediterranean countries. To do so, we have conducted a meta-
analysis based on the qualitative materials of the SAHWA Ethnographic Field-
work (2015) that include ﬁve national case studies, 25 focus group discussions,
23 life stories, 11 focused ethnographic texts, ten narrative interviews, and
one additional personal interview, which we had at our disposal at the time
of writing. For the purposes of this article, the national research teams also
provided us with additional information on the current situation of youth pol-
icies in their respective countries. The quantitative material consists of the
SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 (n = 5.970) conducted by national partner organ-
isations in Tunisia, Egypt, and Lebanon.
Due to its range, the available research material proved an invaluable
source of information although its quality and levels of empirical detail
showed considerable variation. We carefully reﬂected on the limitations and
consistencies in this vast body of material to reach a balanced analysis of
what emerges as key dynamics of engagement among the young respon-
dents. We had prior research experience in the respective countries and
divided the materials accordingly. Upon agreement on the main analytical
avenues, we further studied the SAHWA Ethnographic Fieldwork material
through content analysis, whereby we paid special attention to the forms,
opinions and experiences of political engagement among the respondents.
It involved our collective eﬀorts to transcend the analyses of single ethno-
graphic accounts and move towards meta-ethnographic synthesis through
examining the emerging analogies in the research materials (Noblit and
Hare 1988, 13; Harinen et al. 2015). As regards the quantitative data, the
SAHWA Youth Survey 2016 allowed us to determine statistically robust corre-
lations that hold across all countries and to see certain national diﬀerences in
youth attitudes and behaviour.1 Although the survey was conducted with
respondents aged between 15 and 29 years, our approach to ‘youth’ refers
also to a culturally speciﬁc life stage, or ‘social age’ (Clark-Kazak 2009), that
contains multiple transitions from childhood and schooling toward more
autonomous roles and responsibilities of adulthood, including employment,
family and reproduction.
In this sense, youth is considered as a relational concept that is shaped by
the culturally informed markers of adulthood (Wyn and White 1997). We are
aware that this approach does not fully overlap with the age-cohort
framing adopted in the SAHWA project. Nonetheless, adopting a ‘sociological
gaze’ on what youthfulness may be has enabled a broader, more insightful
reading of the material at our disposal. In particular, it has allowed us to ident-
ify the diﬃculties expressed by many participants to keep up with the
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normative transitions (studies, employment, housing, marriage) that continue
to represent the ideal sequences of entering adulthood in their respective
societies. This disjunction between the social expectations and the realities
of their everyday lives plays a part in the ways young people pursue meaning-
ful societal roles. In this regard, collective reﬂection on this diverse data has
allowed us to trace diﬀerent dimensions of (dis)engagement, and to
examine the dynamism and processes that shape young people’s partici-
pation in public life (see also: Grimm and Pilkington 2015, 207, 226). The analy-
sis of this diverse material was discussed with the researchers who conducted
the ﬁeldwork and they provided additional input to the subjects discussed in
this paper.
‘When I hear “politics”, I escape’: mapping disengagement as
agency
Since the 2011 uprisings, state leadership in these ﬁve countries has repeat-
edly underlined the importance of involving young people in parliamentary
processes and public decision-making. The data suggest that the general
reception among the youth to these calls has been somewhat contradictory.
Zidane (SAHWA Ethnographic Fieldwork 2015, Algeria: Life Story 8, 7), an
unemployed young Algerian man from Akbou near Bejaia City, says that he
does not understand politics in the ﬁrst place and, for him, even the oﬃcial
name of his home country, the ‘Algerian People’s Democratic Republic’ is
merely an empty slogan. He does not personally participate in public activities
that are organised by political parties or civil society organisations but still
follows the regional news and, in particular, the ongoing events in Tunisia
and Egypt. Like many of his peers, he was surprised by the rapid popular upris-
ings in 2011 and their aftermath, but confesses that he is not too enthusiastic
about the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. In his words: ‘Arab countries are rich but
their people are poor. In Algeria, we already had our political and social upris-
ing [in the 1990s]. Now we want stability’. Bechir, another young Algerian man
from the small village of Fethoune near Bejaia and Tizi Ouzou (SAHWA Ethno-
graphic Fieldwork 2015, Algeria: Focus Group 5, 7), polemically banters that
his general approach to even discussing politics is: ‘Whenever I hear “politics”,
I escape’. At the same time, in Morocco, Abdou, a youngman who participated
in a focus group discussion cast doubt on the public calls for youth empow-
erment, pointing to the problematic social interface oﬃcial, state-led empow-
erment initiatives may have with the masses of the young population:
Everyone talks about integration or the involvement of young people in decision
making, but how many young people are actually involved in these decisions?
Isn’t this category of youth exploited in the production of certain policies?
Regarding the forms of participation, we can observe some of them along the
axis of Kenitra, Marrakech until Agadir. But there are other regions where
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young people are not involved at all and they choose non-involvement. Is it a
political choice? [---] They choose to stay at the coﬀee corner, smoking
quietly, watching the sea, they have other concerns. (SAHWA Ethnographic
Fieldwork 2015, Morocco: Focus Group 3, 5)
These personal reﬂections on the relevance of politics by youths in Algeria and
Morocco echo the diverse and not always unproblematic approaches to the
popular uprisings and revolutionary upheavals in the region. Neither
country witnessed rapid political changes in comparison with Tunisia and
Egypt, for instance, bearing witness to the fact that the ﬁve countries under
study represent diverse political heritages and social histories both before
and after the 2011 popular uprisings. Our emphasis on youth disengagement
here is thus not to negate the fact that political turbulence has occurred since
2011, and that youth have often played important roles therein. In Tunisia and
Egypt, Islamists won a majority in the ﬁrst post-2011 parliamentary elections,
although their power has now been replaced: in Egypt through a popular
movement and military takeover in 2013 and in Tunisia by the electoral
victory of a broad-based coalition in 2014. Both countries have witnessed
high levels of political violence and turbulence. In Lebanon, the recent
years of turmoil, the long absence of the presidency, and the inactive govern-
ment due to the political deadlock have led to a wide sense of distrust in
public institutions. Young people have, however, continuously mobilised in
grass-roots movements to address political, social or environmental issues.
In Morocco, the February 20th protest movement emerged into public life
in 2011 and managed to promote legislative reforms that were approved in
a national referendum. Still, according to the young respondents, very little
on the ground has changed in the country. Algeria, too, witnessed sporadic
protest movements and activities in the wake of the 2011 popular uprisings
but, as Zidane suggested above, the 1990s civil war between armed Islamists
and the military provided a forceful reminder for many that social turbulence
may easily lead to years of protracted violence. Despite this turbulence, in the
ﬁve countries under study our data indicates that the large majority of young
people have not participated in public political activities in the mid-2010s.2
The question posed by Abdou, the young Moroccan above, is highly rel-
evant to our discussion and could be rephrased as follows: ‘Is non-involve-
ment a political choice?’ In other words, the ﬁgure of young men passing
time in cafés or on the streets, or hanging about outside watching the sea
and, to start with, having other concerns far from politics, provides a certain
sense of daily life and activities that are shared by scores of young people
in Arab Mediterranean countries. But does their disengagement from public
political life necessarily mean that they remain apathetic about their societies?
Does disengagement imply being inactive in other areas of everyday life? As
Asef Bayat has argued, many marginalised groups, such as the poor, the
young and women, ‘do not sit around passively obeying the diktats of their
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police states, nor did they tie their luck to the verdict of destiny’, continuing:
‘rather, they were always engaged, albeit in mostly dispersed and disparate
struggles in the immediate domains of their everyday life – in the neighbour-
hoods, places of work, street corners, courthouses, communities, and in the
private realms of taste, personal freedom, and preserving dignity’ (Bayat
2013, x–xi).
Before elaborating further on the issue of multiple engagements, it is ﬁrst
necessary to map out some of the qualitative diﬀerences and nuances that are
at times lumped together under the rubric of political engagement. We adopt
a wide understanding of politics as ‘aspect politics’ (Linjakumpu 2007, 12–14;
Palonen 1988, 19) whereby politics is oriented toward, but not exclusive of,
individual and collective action. In this light, any given issue, event or
opinion is social life can be politicised – through debate and antagonistic pos-
itions – and articulated to a wider set of demands and grievances. This
approach diﬀers from the more ‘sectoral view on politics’ as an institutional
ﬁeld which consists of politicians, political parties, municipal councils, parlia-
mentary processes and other formal organisations in public political life.
In addition, youth researchers Ekman and Amnå (2012) provide a typology
of both manifest and latent forms of political participation that is useful for our
discussion. By manifest political participation, they refer to direct forms of
public political engagement such as voting, political party membership,
protest activities and awareness campaigning in public life. Latent partici-
pation, for its part, is less direct and includes more informal activities, civic
engagement and social involvement at the everyday level beyond formal
organisations. The latter forms of political engagement were prevalent in
authoritarian settings in the Middle East and North Africa long before the
2011 uprisings (Alhamad 2008; Lust-Okar and Zerhouni 2008; Singerman
1997).
In our discussion, however, it is useful to consider the agentive dimensions
of disengagement which, in Ekman and Amnå’s terms, can be considered as
an indirect (or latent) form of political participation (Ekman and Amnå 2012).
In this context, they propose to diﬀerentiate between passive and active
forms of disengagement. While passive disengagement implies the lack of
interest and relatedness to current aﬀairs at individual and collective levels,
active disengagement refers more to purposeful activities to avoid politics
and political discussions; this qualitative diﬀerence cannot be downplayed
since while the former stems from lack of interest, the latter is more a
matter of disillusionment or even disgust. In the lives of young people, it
may refer to a variety of moments and activities whereby they seek, if not
to ‘escape’, then at least to avoid and keep away from anything related to
public and oﬃcial realms of political life. The active disengagement does
not necessarily imply that young people are indiﬀerent towards current
aﬀairs, or do not have personal or collective stances on topical political,
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economic and social issues in their societies and globally. This view corre-
sponds with the analysis of our research material which points to somewhat
widespread negative attitudes that are coupled with simultaneous disdain
and lack of trust among young respondents against formal political insti-
tutions in their respective countries. This stance is clearly described in the
National Case Study from Tunisia:
The reading of the data collected reveals disenchantment with regard to politics.
Several expressions put forward by our interviewees describe young people’s
loss of conﬁdence in politics. The rhetoric of non-credibility recurs relatively fre-
quently in the discourse on political life in the transitional context. This rhetoric
is built around observations of the ambiguity of politics, as may be seen through
the statements made by ‘Farid’: ‘I don’t understand anything in politics, we live,
we may say, in a desert, we follow a path whose end we ignore’. Also they
described the hypocrisy of the political world, as ‘Said’ says: ‘Now, politics is
lies, personal interests… not to speak of promises. They are all liars… Though
I have my ideological orientation… believe me they are all liars. The experience
of 2008 taught us, trained us. The people you see on the TV, the political men…
we need to start over’. On another level, the young people consider that ‘our
politics’ is dictated from abroad (‘Sami’ & ‘Karim’). These diﬀerent represen-
tations of politics express young people’s disinterest in a politics they consider
to be ‘a headache’ (‘Smail’). (National case study Tunisia, SAHWA Project, 19)
This excerpt echoes the general trend in the data, underlining that one of the
main features of disengagement among young respondents is that they com-
monly cultivate a negative and state-centred view of politics. While acknowl-
edging the different social histories of each country, there are several registers
through which young respondents articulate their negative attitudes towards
public political life in general. Among the most common perception of sec-
toral politics is that it represents an exclusive domain where groups and indi-
viduals seek personal beneﬁts at the cost of the common good, or what is best
for society as a whole. This view thus reduces ‘politics’ to a game in which
different actors pursue their own interests at the expense of social justice,
rule of law, and equal distribution of resources, and are pressured to compro-
mise their values and ideals, and consequently risk becoming corrupted in
one way or another. Moreover, politics is characterised as a deliberative
domain where ideological rhetoric and statements prevail, and where lofty
goals and promises are made, but as a rule these rarely lead to tangible
changes in everyday life.
In short, young respondents consider politics to be a sphere of society that
can hardly be inﬂuenced by lay citizens on their own. Although the 2011 upris-
ings witnessed rapid political upheavals through which scores of young
people engaged in public debate, and diﬀerent forms of manifest and
latent political participation, the rekindled interest in politics of the period
has gradually given way to other considerations. While the large majority of
young people in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon do not
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involve themselves in public politics or voluntary activities, they are by no
means passive in other areas of their everyday lives, such as studies, taking
up courses, working, ﬁnding work, and so on. Often, these more personal
goals work against the option of engaging in civil society organisations, the
majority of which are in the ﬁeld of social service delivery and charity work.
For Salwa, a young woman from southern Egypt, engaging with ‘Resala’ – a
major charity organisation in Egypt – during university gave her experience
of engaging in philanthropy and ‘doing good’ for society as a whole:
‘Resala’ was accessible for me during college when I used to live in ‘Beni – Suef’
governorate. Salwa adds that ‘Resala’ is also available in her hometown of Menya
but it is far away from where she lives. Salwa adds that when she used to work in
‘Resala’ she used to help a group of blind people. She dedicated herself once a
week to sit down and read them a book while they sat down and thought it
through. Other activities that ‘Resala’ oﬀered while Salwa helped there was
the process of collecting old or used clothes and washing them and preparing
them, then distributing them to the most needy. Salwa dictates that helping out
in ‘Resala’ created a sense of responsibility and self-worth for Salwa. After
ﬁnishing college, Salwa wanted to actually work and stopped approaching
charity organizations where she used to help out. (SAHWA Ethnographic Field-
work 2015, Egypt: Narrative Interview 4, 2–3)
Several young Egyptian respondents mentioned Resala as the organisation in
which they had volunteered at some point of their lives. It was established
long before the 2011 uprising, and represents one of the major youth-led
civil society organisations in Egypt. Although its members may have personal
afﬁliations or sympathies with diverse more politically oriented groups, since
its inception it has been adamant about not involving itself in public political
affairs and focused on service delivery, student activities on university cam-
puses, and so on (Lei Sparre 2013). On the other hand, Salwa’s decision to
quit her voluntary activities after graduation is indicative of the wider
phenomenon whereby youth transitions and ruptures in life courses may
shape their opportunities and willingness to engage in public life more gen-
erally. This is central to the dynamics of engagement among youth in Arab
Mediterranean countries. Unless voluntary, or practically unpaid, work sup-
ports their future life trajectories in the form of job opportunities, young
people seldom have time for it, even if they would like to. It draws close to
what Florence Passy and Marco Giugni (2000) suggest: the tensions and syner-
gies between different spheres of everyday life – such as family, friends,
studies, and employment – necessitate constant consideration as to how
youth can negotiate their public commitments and activities in the making
of their personal and collective futures (Onodera 2015). In general, those
young people who are able to combine their philanthropic engagements
and political commitments with other exigencies of everyday life are able
to engage in public engagements more easily than others. Having a job in
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a civil society organisation, for instance, eases the tensions between activism
and earning a living. In this way, some are able to combine political involve-
ment – following the news, participating in seminars and online discussions –
with their everyday life. The insight provided by this notion of life spheres is
helpful to analytically approach the fact that although manifest political par-
ticipation has waned by the mid-2010s, it does not mean that youth are inac-
tive in other areas of life that are of more urgent concern for their present lives
and future life chances.
On the prospects of politicisation
Young people’s negative attitudes toward, and disengagement from, sectoral
politics raises the question of their politicisation. To what extent can the
refusal to take part in public political life be seen as politicised agency? The
notion of politicisation naturally lends itself to multiple meanings; here it
implies a rather extensive deﬁnition that envisions the individual and collec-
tive acquisition of theoretical and practical knowledge of current aﬀairs, and
the willingness to use this knowledge as a resource to formulate certain atti-
tudes for changing the status quo in public life. This view implies acknowled-
ging the processes and circumstances in which young people are prone to
connect their aspect of political relevance to concrete action.
This analytical approach is inspired by William Gamson (1992) who dis-
tinguishes between three interconnected sequences in the processes of poli-
ticisation. According to him, people ﬁrst conceive a moral indignation in front
of a given experience. Then, they construct a collective perception of this
problem. Finally, they acquire the willingness to act on it. Gamson coins
these, respectively, as the injustice frame, identity frame, and agency frame.
Activated together, they are also constitutive of a process of ‘desingulariza-
tion’ (Eliasoph 1998): the construction of a ‘we’ among persons who share
an understanding of how a speciﬁc experience reﬂects a wider division of
power within society. As such, according to Gamson, politicisation aﬀects indi-
viduals, inciting them to act in a more or less organised way so as to enforce
their experiences and visions of ‘living together’. Gamson’s approach is useful
in breaking down the notion of politicisation into a set of distinctive and
identiﬁable processes. Considering the occurrences of injustice, identity and
agency frames in the testimonies of the youth hence enables to track the
imprints of politicisation and eventually requalify some of their attitudes poli-
ticised, or at least, carrying the potential for politicisation. In this context, the
young respondents’ shared sense of the lack of future prospects is especially
pronounced and carries the view that their life chances are sanctioned by the
ruling classes of elder generations. They express diﬃculties in making the
aspired transitions to adulthood due to the conditions imposed on them by
the wider social, economic and political processes. However, these youth
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grievances seldom materialise into protracted collective actions (SAHWA
Youth Survey 2016).
For example, it has been suggested that low voter turnout rates among
young people might be a result of active criticism towards the existing politi-
cal system. Rather than merely pointing to youth’s disengagement, they point
towards a lack of eﬀective participation and the diﬃculties young people have
inﬂuencing the course of public aﬀairs in their countries. In this light, active
disengagement materialises in an apparent contradiction between politicisa-
tion and low electoral participation, and is nourished by the dialectics of trust
and distrust (Cammaerts et al. 2014). As noted above, our material clearly indi-
cates that young respondents cultivate predominantly negative perceptions
and attitudes towards sectoral politics and formal political organisations.
In Lebanon, the survey data shows that 62% of respondents express no conﬁ-
dence at all in the parliament or politicians, and 53.8% in political parties
(SAHWA Youth Survey 2016). For instance, Walid, a young university
student in Beirut, regards public political life as a highly distant sphere that
seems unappealing for a variety of reasons:
… so if you want to talk about improving life in this country… if you want to talk
about happiness and what makes a person happy here in Lebanon… you need
a system that encourages hope and faith in the (political system) and one that
rewards that (not like here in Lebanon) or it isn’t going to work… there is
instead despair… the kind of society that comes from this current regime is
one that naturalises religious sectarianism (or it is natural for this system to
impose religious sectarianism on people) and that you become an obeying
sheep (goat) to the political zaim (leader)… and you can’t get work in what
you do because it goes to those employers who have wasta… and this is
what brings despair and discontent. So if you do enter into the political
system (and the government) then (in order to survive) you have to be the
person who is sawing… and you have to exploit others and not the other
way round. You have to try to be the one in control… if you enter into the
system. I don’t want to be part of this system… I don’t want to exploit others
because this will drive me to the ground (I can’t do it). (SAHWA Ethnographic
Fieldwork 2015, Lebanon: Life Story 1, 13)
Walid’s views are indicative of the personal and collective preferences for dis-
engaging from sectoral politics and its practices among young people. Their
choices are connected to a gradual loss of conﬁdence in public authorities and
a shared disillusionment as regards tangible reforms in the future. His views
resemble those of Yacine, a young Moroccan who has never participated in
elections during his lifetime:
From his point of view the elected representatives only fulﬁl their own interests:
‘Some vote, but personally I don’t vote. The president [of the Government of the
Kingdom of Morocco] is aware of the various problems that we have related to
sanitation and waste disposal, yet he doesn’t do anything.’ About the uprising in
2011 ‘Yacine’ explains that there were some protests organised in Fes, but not in
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Ain Taoujdate. People went to the street to protest against the setting up of a
factory but ‘nothing changed’. (SAHWA Ethnographic Fieldwork 2015,
Morocco: Life Story 2, 5)
Although Yacine’s reﬂections prioritise the issues of daily subsistence and live-
lihood over political participation, they nonetheless reﬂect political awareness.
Indeed, socioeconomic demands and political grievances are often inter-
twined. In the lives of young people, these are frequently connected to the
immediate concerns of ﬁnding suitable jobs. Several respondents consider
the educational qualiﬁcations as largely inconsequential for pursuing their
career aspirations, although for men it is often a prerequisite for being eligible
for marriage. Pursuing a university degree is in this context little more than a
social obligation, and it does not secure one’s job prospects or future career.
This situation partly results from the mismatch between the available curricula
in higher education and the needs of today’s labour market, especially in the
formal private sector (Honwana 2012). In addition, several respondents claim
that employers demand previous work experience which is a challenging
requirement for fresh university graduates (see also: Ahad and Tzannatos
2016).
Moreover, bemoaned by many, securing a suitable job (or any job, for that
matter) often requires ‘right’ social connections, or wasta, which was seen by
many to promote nepotistic recruitment practices at the expense of personal
merits and skills:
You graduate from university, then wasta (connections) to ﬁnd a job–and you
have to if you want enter in the work you want and do the speciality you
want, then you need to have a base… so if you want to become an engineer
then you need to have the training from an engineer and so on and forth…
but you also need connections. (SAHWA Ethnographic Fieldwork 2015,
Lebanon: Focus Group 1, 13)
According to SAHWA Youth Survey 2016, 96% of the young Lebanese respon-
dents denounce the corruption and nepotism that occur in their country.
While such expressions of felt injustice are recurrent in the material, the ques-
tion of wasta also seems to nourish the construction of a youth identity frame.
In the context of political and societal orders governed by clientelism and
dominated by elder men, most youth complain of being disconnected from
the processes of decision-making that affect their future lives. Such senses
of alienation do not encourage engagement in public affairs, including its
alternative forms as the survey data indicate – between 80% and 90% of
the Lebanese respondents say they have never participated in any associative
activities, demonstrations or strikes (SAHWA Survey – Lebanon, 67). More gen-
erally, the majority – lowest in Morocco (84.2%) and highest in Egypt (96.5%) –
has not belonged to any political party, while the respective numbers for
those never belonged to a political movement range between 85.1%
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(Morocco) and 98.1% (Egypt). While these numbers are not globally excep-
tional, the restricted spaces of expressing discontent and extremely low
levels of trust in the capacity of change are prone to sustain active forms of
disengagement and shared perceptions of injustice that, beyond the appear-
ance of stability, may result in eruptions of intense mobilisation at regular
interval.
For instance, the You Stink! – movement stirred alternative dynamism in
Lebanon’s public life over the summer 2015 (BP Lebanon 2016). The
neglect of garbage collection led to the movement’s escalation as rubbish
piled up and encroached on the streets in several municipalities. Driven pre-
dominantly by young Beirutis (Abi Yaghi, Catusse, and Younes 2016), the
movement gained support from various strata of the population, cutting
across communal and geographical divisions that normally hinder
cooperation in building eﬀective public campaigns. As the movement grew
so did its demands, from the mundane issues of rubbish on the streets to
encompass several charges against public authorities, the latter’s corrupt
practices and mismanagement of public funds, as well as the wider shortcom-
ings of the sectarian political system (Abi Yaghi, Catusse, and Younes 2016).
The tension rapidly rose as the youth took the streets and the movement
escalated in riots opposing young demonstrators and security forces in down-
town Beirut, around the national Parliament. In spite of the relative decline of
the movement, the images of young people attacking both verbally and
physically the established political order and traditional leaders were symbolic
of the strength of sense of injustice experienced by them. The episode also
demonstrated the relative as well as the explosive nature of youth disengage-
ment. Starting from environmental concerns, the crisis rapidly translated into
explicitly political demands that erupted into an outburst of violence. The
movement took the question of garbage management in the streets of
Beirut as ‘an alternative political space’ and was hence in position to
‘expand the boundaries of the political’ (Melucci and Avritzer 2000, 509).
Despite its ultimately limited outcomes, You Stink! spurred a number of
youth-led grass-roots movements and NGOs that address the renovation of
the political order more explicitly. Among them are the collectives ‘Badna
Nhasib’ (We want accountability) or ‘Nahnoo’ (We) (BP Lebanon 2016). Pro-
moting a secular vision of Lebanon, these gatherings seek to encourage the
emergence of genuine public spaces in a country where powerful political
parties and private economic actors maintain their domination over physical
as well as symbolic spaces. Their strategies are to confront public authorities
to force them into engaging with issues that aﬀect the lives of young people.
Yet, these campaigns are still impeded by the coalition of the political estab-
lishment and their capacity to mobilise rises and falls according to the
contexts.
292 H. ONODERA ET AL.
As the above Lebanese cases indicate, processes of youth politicisation are
rarely linear but, rather, they ﬂuctuate (Lefort 2016, 13). Indeed, to use
Gamson’s terminology, the sequence of the three frames cannot be
assumed and rarely do they coalesce in the form of fully ﬂedged mobilisation.
At times youth groups and nascent movements may denounce an injustice
without translating it into the perception of a shared identity. In such cases,
diﬀerences by social class, sect or religion and political aﬃliation or ideology
may become more pertinent and divisive issues. Likewise, others may identify
themselves with a collective cause or, even, generational location but these
conceptions may not materialise into collective actions. The diﬀerences in
strategic thinking and aspired outcomes may come to prevent protracted col-
lective actions. In other words, the activation of the injustice, identity, and
agency frames is largely dependent on the wider social, economic and politi-
cal processes that shape the prospects of public mobilisation. Processes of
politicisation thus always encompass potential limits, ruptures and reconﬁ-
gurations, not least due to the outside constraint from legislation, public auth-
orities, security services and political patronage. Individuals may be
temporarily politicised and then depoliticised due to circumstances, but
their social networks and shared experiences may live through the periods
of demobilisation, too, through what Verta Taylor (1989) calls ‘abeyance net-
works’ that can be activated when opportunities arise. In this light, youth-
based collectivities may sustain through shared lifestyles as well as informal
friendship groups, and as ‘hidden networks of groups, meeting points, circuits
of solidarity which diﬀer profoundly from the image of the politically orga-
nized actor’ (Melucci 1996, 115; see also: Onodera 2018). Thus the protracted
and collective forms of active disengagement within society can contain
rather explosive potential. This characteristic sheds a particular light on the
events of the Arab Spring themselves. The seemingly mundane issues, such
as the way the police deals with unlicensed fruit sellers may rapidly gain
aspects of wider political discontent, and channel a number of other grie-
vances, as what happened in Tunisia in December 2010.
Thus, although the mid-2010s can be characterised as a period of relative
stability and lack of political upheaval, the events of the 2011 uprisings have
played a big part in forging new alliances and submerged networks that could
be politicised in the aftermath. The revolutionary claims for ‘bread, freedom,
and social justice’ and ‘dignity’ provide central discursive frames that have
shaped consequent processes of politicisation too. In Tunisia and Egypt,
especially, the claims of ownership of the revolution by the Islamist and
secular-nationalist segments of the population have produced particular tur-
bulence. For example, as reported by the SAHWA Project team from the Amer-
ican University of Cairo, the youth-led Tamarod (Revolt) movement played
important roles in opposing the rule of President Mohamed Morsi and the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, collecting over 22 million signatures –
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roughly a quarter of Egypt’s population – for a petition demanding his resig-
nation and new presidential elections. The main demands of the petition
addressed the dire economic conditions and better living conditions for the
poor, the restoration of security after series of clashes between protesters
and the public authorities, and bringing justice for the people killed by the
police during and after the mass uprisings in 2011. Morsi’s presidency was
brought down in cooperation with the military, leading to violent clashes
and the suppression of pro-Morsi protests, with each camp blaming the
other for monopolising their share of the 2011 revolution. The polarisation
of public opinion that ensued, coupled with new restrictions on street protest-
ing and associational life, and the internally waged ‘war against terror’ against
armed Islamist militants have not been inconsequential for the prospects of
politicisation among the youth ever since. In a focus group discussion,
some participants in political and awareness-raising campaigning since
2011 indicated that there are renewed risks in engaging in manifest political
activities:
Many believe that there is a depression state, or a stagnation state of political
participation amongst themselves and youth in general, they do not believe
that there is complete freedom of speech as there is some fear of saying their
own opinions. However they agreed that the danger is not on all Egyptian
youth but certain inﬂuential ones. (SAHWA Ethnographic Fieldwork 2015,
Egypt: Focus Group 3, 6).
Livelihood considerations
Levels of repression and impunity, social instability and economic hardships
have an obvious impact on young people’s ways of living out their engage-
ments. Public contestation represents a risk for individuals as well all collective
actors, especially in the post-2011 era in which several associations have been
publicly charged for conspiring with outside agencies. In their study of politi-
cisation in Morocco, Frederic Vairel and Lamia Zaki (2011, 104) have demon-
strated that many civil society actors opt for non-confrontational strategies as
a way to avoid political pressure from the authorities (see also: Abdou and
Skalli 2018). In addition, not all individuals beneﬁt from the same opportu-
nities. Structural and cultural obstacles to political participation are more pro-
nounced among young women. Similarly, young people’s background in
terms of household, socioeconomic status, and educational levels continues
to be a major factor in determining the levels of civic participation among
youth in the region (OECD 2015, 50; Colombo 2016, 15). It is also clear from
the SAHWA Youth Survey that the most immediate concerns of young
people do not revolve around political reform but problems closer to home
– the ‘bread and butter’ issues that are most pressing for their present lives
and future life chances. In the ﬁve national survey studies, the majority of
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young respondents regarded ‘the economic situation’, ‘people’s standard of
living’ and ‘jobs’ as the biggest problems in their countries.3 Out of 13 alterna-
tives, these three answers amounted to 74% in Egypt, 65% in Tunisia, 55% in
Algeria and Lebanon, and 46% in Morocco (Maiche et al. 2017). The issues of
unemployment and nepotistic recruitment practices, especially, are seen as a
collective problem in all ﬁve countries, suggesting that the socioeconomic
injustice frame has not withered away in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings.
Youth unemployment runs high in all ﬁve countries, pushing many to
unstable jobs in informal economies with little job security or social
beneﬁts, and to precarious living conditions. A focus group discussion in
Morocco raised the view that:
The fact of being within the underground economy is in itself a protest against
the state and various socioeconomic actors, supposed to ﬁght against poverty,
not leave citizens ﬁght individually for solutions by themselves. (SAHWA Ethno-
graphic Fieldwork 2015, Morocco: Focus Group 4, 7).
In the post-2011 era, young people are, as Hassan and Dyer (2017, 10) argue, ‘a
tremendous source for creativity, innovation, and hard work’ and ‘the promise
of a better future for the region as a whole’. Addressing their main concerns –
including their economic situation, standard of living, and employment –
remains central to the popular legitimacy of public authorities for years to
come, since economic strains nourish moral indignation as well as necessities
to act. They participate in a ‘politicization of the constraints’ (Vairel and Zaki
2011, 92) that pushes young people to look for alternative solutions to
make their living and voice their indignation when state institutions are
losing their credibility. Such forms of resistance are more than ever present
today while the repercussions of the global ﬁnancial (and food) crisis of the
late 2000s continues, but now coupled with further political instability, secur-
itisation of public space and added uncertainties.
In the post-2011 era, sometimes the seemingly non-political things – such
as having a job – gain new political aspects due to societal events and the
rapid shifts in public debates. Salma, a 25-year-old craftswoman living in
Tunisia, explains that even her profession has recently become a contested
issue. Working in craftsmanship and thus following the vocation of both her
parents, her livelihood would not be conventionally seen as politicised. In
unstable conditions, however, it forces new considerations on her about her
livelihood as well as the role of her vocational choice in the building of the
post-Ben Ali society today:
She is concerned with the political situation in the country. Since revolution, she
actively watches television programs and debates about current news. She is
aware that her professional activity has a tight relation with the country political
stability. Suppliers, she says, clients and tourists depend on security in the
country. Her activity being related to women, art and decoration could be
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negatively perceived by several stubborn extremists. Thus, she thinks that she
could be a target of their wrath one day. From her point-of view violence in
general and terrorism in particular represent the main threats facing the
country. After the revolution, violence, obscenities and the lack of civism have
become generalized and common everywhere. Many times, she has been
victim of that. She feels she lives in insecurity. (SAHWA Ethnographic Fieldwork
2015, Tunisia: Focused Ethnography 3, 7–8)
Ultimately, in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in Tunisia, Salma hoped to emi-
grate abroad due to the worsening life chances she saw in post-revolutionary
Tunisia. In comparison with most of her peers, she enjoyed a privileged pos-
ition due to an opportunity to relocate to Canada with her husband, despite
her reluctance to leave her home and family far behind. The sense of insecur-
ity – coupled here with the longing for migration – that surfaces clearly in our
data brings an added dimension to the lives of today’s youth that shapes their
experience of engaging with their current and future lives. For some, the goal
of migrating and working abroad is more directly linked to their life chances,
especially for men so that they can save for the costs of marriage or to support
their family back home.
In the past, I didn’t like to think a lot about leaving… I love my country and
being around and caring for my family… at the same time the way this
country going in terms of society and the psychology of this country…well
of course one starts to think of leaving… .(SAHWA Ethnographic Fieldwork
2015, Lebanon: Life Story 3, 15)
In the qualitative data, the large majority of youth wish to migrate abroad for
work, mainly to the Persian Gulf, Europe and North America. At the same time,
some would like to build their lives closer to home and to contribute their pro-
ductive forces to the building of the new economy. In a focus group discus-
sion in Alexandria, Egypt, the national research team observes that after a
debate on migration:
… a lot started discussing the idea of nationalism and the sense of belonging-
ness to the country, and the idea of being responsible of improving the
country. Overall, most of the participants believed that migrating or completely
leaving the country would not do any good neither to the person nor the
country. (SAHWA Ethnographic Fieldwork 2015, Egypt: Focus Group 4, 8)
In this light, the aspirations of leaving or staying connect individual life
courses to wider societal processes in the post-2011 context, although most
would not want to leave their families behind. The main push factor is con-
nected to the challenges of gaining a livelihood while the issues of public
engagement do not rate as so high a concern. It remains true that while for
some, like Salma, craftsmanship and artistic expression are directly linked to
their vocation and livelihood, for others they are also a question of mediating
alternative views in public life. As for the latter prospect in Tunisia, there have
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been new youth initiatives to provide new opportunities for young artists in
the post-Ben Ali era. One such initiative is called ‘Artist despite myself’,
which promotes the view that art is both a space for expression and a
bridge for communication and dialogue in society, thus holding onto the
expression that art is ‘a space of inclusion and acceptation and not a space
of exclusion’ that had already emerged before 2011 (BP Tunisia 2016). In
this way, groups of young Tunisians have introduced new practices of
mediation and participatory politics, while contributing to public life with
added criticism and acts of citizenship. This can be seen as an extension of
a wider phenomenon in Tunisia, Egypt and other countries too, where
young people have created new genres of music and ‘street art’ – grafﬁti, per-
formances and the like – to express their dissent, while trying to keep away
from the political authorities (see also: Laine, Suurpää, and Ltiﬁ 2018).
In such contexts, civil society actors may play a role in encouraging alterna-
tive modes of engagement that are not necessarily framed as explicitly politi-
cal. As Nina Eliasoph has shown in a diﬀerent context, civil society movements
often present themselves as ‘avoiding politics’ (1998), hence carrying a norma-
tive distinction between civil society and public political actors. The former
being seen as a positive alternative to the latter, envisioned negatively due
to corruption, ineﬃciency, and authoritarian forms of governance. This kind
of distinction between civil society formations and sectoral politics prevails
in our material. We should, however, remain critical of this distinction in
Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia, as, elsewhere, civil society
actors can also be connected in many ways to political elites, state-level
bureaucracies, businesses, important public ﬁgures, and diﬀerent forms of
institutional backing. Moreover, civil society initiatives can also be considered
negatively by the young, whose distrust encompasses not only governmental
institutions and political parties, but civil society associations, too. Views from
a focus group discussion in Algeria are illustrative in this respect:
It is as true as the Algerian young people are very weakly structured in non-gov-
ernmental organizations. It shows that the scale of the lack of conﬁdence which
exceeds the governmental organizations or the political parties: ‘the young
people can also have a bad experience when they are mobilized in collective
actions with the organizations of the civil society. When the young person
does voluntary work and he notices a mismanagement, he will have a bad
idea on these organizations. Thus there will be a reliable break’. This other
declaration asserts the break of the conﬁdence between the young people
and the political world: ‘at the beginning of the political experience in Algeria
he trusted there. But after the events the young people divided. The majority
lost conﬁdence, the others adopted the politics as the way of upward social
ascent’. (SAHWA Ethnographic Fieldwork 2015, Algeria: Focus Group 9, 11)
Ultimately, for the large majority of youth, resolving the tensions between
livelihood and public engagement is not an alternative. Yet, although the
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youth survey suggests high levels of disengagement, the qualitative materials
– many of which were collected under the auspices of local associations –
provide a nuanced picture. In this context, civic engagement is mainly
framed in terms of community development, tangible aid to poor families
(including clothes, food and monthly allowance) or vulnerable people (e.g.
orphans), and ﬁnancial help to get married. The focus group discussions on
civic participation were in general divided into views that emphasised
either the individual’s role and responsibility as a member of the family, neigh-
bourhood and society, or the role of civic associations in service delivery. In
Egypt, some respondents regard NGOs as important in terms of offering ser-
vices that are not done by the government, and also identiﬁed NGOs as plat-
forms to engage in aspect politics, including awareness-raising campaigns. On
the contrary, others would declare themselves not interested at all in politics,
and that civic associations should not be involved in sectoral politics. Overall,
both quantitative and qualitative data underline the ambivalent potential of
young people’s politicisation. While active disengagement seems to prevail
in the mid-2010s, it does not exclude alternative forms and repertoires of
engagement. In restricted political settings, the seemingly non-political
aspects of everyday life – such as environmental concerns in Lebanon –
may rapidly be articulated to wider political demands, while obstacles to
formal political participation sustain alternative tactics of political expression,
such as new forms of ‘street art’ in Tunisia and elsewhere. This illuminates Rhys
Farthing’s (2010) statement that ‘young people are simultaneously disen-
gaged and engaged’ by which he draws attention to their disengagement
from the established forms of sectoral politics and their reﬂections on
aspect politics through the exploration of new agoras to inﬂuence their
social surroundings. It remains the case that the young respondents are
faced with the situation in which their autonomous efforts of mobilisation
are ever more challenging and volatile.
Concluding remarks
In this article, we have examined the dynamics of engagement among young
people in ﬁve Arab Mediterranean countries. While the so-called Arab Spring
witnessed a high peak of youth mobilisation in the early 2010s, the appearance
of today’s political demobilisation among young people is connected to several
coinciding issues. The widespread lack of trust in political institutions, coupled
with economic hardship and the rise of insecurity and political violence have
resulted in increasingly cautious attitudes among young people toward
public political engagements. However, in many respects, this trend yields
complex and often contradictory dynamics. As we have pointed out, the
appearance of politically demobilised young people does not imply that they
lack opinions on current aﬀairs: many choose to disengage from public political
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life due to the risks involved or the disillusionment with the unfulﬁlled revolu-
tionary or reformist processes. Also, although the high levels of unemployment
may promote the stereotypical imagery of ‘apathetic’ or ‘idle’ youth, it does not
necessarily tell us much about their aspirations to work hard, nor of political
views, or their willingness to act when opportunities arise.
Reﬂecting on the great diversity of life experiences both between and
within the ﬁve countries under review, we have also attempted to make
justice to the plurality and heterogeneity of the so-called Arab youth. None-
theless, it remains that a sociological reading of what being young may
mean in these ﬁve countries reveal a series of meaningful similarities, in par-
ticular in terms of (dis)engagement. Overall, it seems that the 2010s has wit-
nessed a collective movement from public engagements to more personal
politics around life aspirations. In this context, we argue for the importance
of paying attention to the agentic dimensions of youth disengagement as a
collective phenomenon. Rather than reinforcing yet another set of rigid dual-
isms – such as passive and active disengagement – it is important to pay
attention to speciﬁc moments in the life course and young people’s gendered
trajectories in multiple spheres of everyday life that are helpful in conceiving
the matters of politicisation and political engagement as dynamic processes.
Young respondents discussed in this article have in the main refocused their
daily eﬀorts on issues that have direct relevance to their present lives and
future life chances. In other words, given that the prospects of inﬂuencing
the sphere of sectoral politics seem blocked, the personal and collective
quests of education, employment, and eventually marriage are for them
much more relevant and existential.
In the turbulent 2010s, these youth transitions remain highly precarious and
uncertain in comparison with the life experience of the earlier generations.
Indeed, today’s youth, who in the main grew up under longstanding and
authoritarian regimes, share the formative experiences of revolutionary hope
for systemic change, and consequent disillusionment. The low levels of trust
in sectoral politics and its institutions hardly concern youth alone but, in com-
parison to their elders, young people’s hopes and reﬂections on what life has to
oﬀer are by necessity oriented toward the future; their adult lives with new sets
of roles and responsibilities are in many ways yet to begin. The more their
eﬀorts prove to be in vain in the multiple spheres of life and aspiration, the
more it aggregates discontent and felt injustices among them, thus lowering
the threshold for politicisation processes in the long run. In this respect, the
socioeconomic policy initiatives on aﬀordable housing, educational reform
and job creation, that aim at more equitable share of national resources,
remain are crucial processes for years to come. At the same time, these
should be implemented in parallel with other initiatives that result in wider
youth experiences of being genuinely included in decision-making processes
that result in tangible changes in their everyday lives.
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Notes
1. We are greatly indebted to the expertise of Martta Myllylä from the Finnish
Youth Research Network when analysing the quantitative data.
2. According to the SAHWA Youth Survey, some 13% of young respondents in
Lebanon had participated in two (out of six) public activities during the past
12 months. The proportions in in Egypt were 3% and in Tunisia 5%, respectively
(Laine et al. 2016, 12–14).
3. These three answers were chosen out of 13 options. The other options were: Ter-
rorism; Education; Democracy and human rights; The increasing inﬂuence of reli-
gion over government; The health system; Corruption; Morals in society;
Housing; Criminality and drugs; Other (please specify).
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